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Understanding the Millennial Vote in 2016: Findings from GenForward

A summary of key findings from the first-of-its-kind monthly
survey of racially and ethnically diverse young adults

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black youth project

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GenForward: A survey of the Black Youth Project with the
AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research.

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Reports and topline of the GenForward surveys by the
Black Youth Project are available at:

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I. Black Youth Project and the GenForward Survey

For over 10 years, the Black Youth Project (BYP), housed at the Center for the Study of Race, Politics, and Culture at the University of Chicago, has dedicated its work to understanding the challenges and opportunities faced by young people of color in the contemporary United States. We are committed to disaggregating the larger category often labeled Millennials because our previous research has shown important differences in lived experiences and political attitudes among young adults of different racial and ethnic backgrounds.¹ We continue this mission with our GenForward surveys.

GenForward is a survey of the Black Youth Project at the University of Chicago with the Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. The GenForward Survey is the first of its kind—a nationally representative survey of over 1750 young adults ages 18-30 conducted monthly that pays special attention to how race and ethnicity influences how respondents experience and think about the world. Given the importance of race and ethnicity for shaping the diverse perspectives and lived experiences of young people, we believe researchers make a mistake when they present data on young adults in a manner that assumes a monolithic Millennial generation and young adult vote.

Young adults now represent the largest generation of Americans, and they are by far the most racially and ethnically diverse generation in the country.² About 19 percent of millennials identify as Latino or Hispanic, 13 percent as Black or African American, and 6 percent as Asian American. Thus, to fully understand how young people think about elections and politicians, issues such as terrorism or gun violence, as well as their economic futures and race relations, we have to apply an intersectional lens and pay attention to characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality. In this report, we provide an extensive analysis of the youth vote in the 2016 presidential election. Specifically, we look at data we collected in early and late October to give greater detail to the factors that shaped how different groups of young adults voted in this election.

The report reflects the Black Youth Project's sustained commitment to *knowledge*, *voice* and *action* among young people, in particular young people of color. We create *knowledge* by detailing the real-life experiences of young people and how their perspectives and preferences differ based on their race and ethnicity. We help amplify

¹ See, for example, our previous report, *Black Millennials in America* (available at http://blackyouthproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/BYP_ReportDesign04b_Dec03_HiRes.pdf).

² See: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/31/10-demographic-trends-that-are-shaping-the-u-s-and-the-world/>.

their *voices* by providing platforms and opportunities for young people to weigh in on the issues most important to them. Finally, we present our data in an accessible form to multiple constituencies with the hope that our findings will contribute to a call to *action* to bring about change rooted in the ways young people of color experience contemporary America and imagine a more equal and just future.

II. Key Findings



- > Likely young adult voters were deeply divided by race and ethnicity. A majority of all 18-30-year-old African Americans (84%), Asian Americans (76%), and Latino/as (70%) reported that they had voted or would vote for Hillary Clinton in November. This is compared to only 46% of young likely white voters who indicated an intention to vote for Hillary Clinton at the close of the campaign.
- > Our data in the month of October showed a severe tightening of the race between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump to secure the white Millennial vote. In the survey we fielded during the first two weeks of October, white youth favored Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump by 14 percentage points.³ In our last survey before the election, fielded between October 20th and November 3rd, we find a much narrower three-percentage point advantage for Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump among white youth.
- > Our data suggest that our new empirical measure of white vulnerability was an important predictor of young whites' support for Donald Trump. Our new measure of white vulnerability, however, is not just an assessment of young whites' perceived economic vulnerability but includes their feelings of racial resentment and sexism.
- > Feelings towards President Obama had a large effect on support for Hillary Clinton across all racial and ethnic groups. Individuals with warm feelings towards the president were much more likely to support Hillary Clinton.
- > Perceptions that the country is moving toward greater political equality increased support for Hillary Clinton among both African Americans and whites.
- > Feeling alienated from politics and government decreased Clinton's support among Latino/as and Asian Americans.

³ See our report on the first October survey here:
<http://genforwardsurvey.com/assets/uploads/2016/10/Horse-Race-Report--Final.pdf>

III. The Demographics of Likely Youth Voters in 2016

The Youth Vote in 2016

The youth vote was critical to the outcome of the 2016 elections. Estimates from exit polls indicate that nearly 24 million young adults 18-29 turned out to the polls on Election Day, which is approximately 50% of eligible young voters.⁴ This represents nearly 19% of the total 2016 electorate (about the same that young voters accounted for in 2012). Millennials represented a more sizeable group of the electorate than those 65 and older (who comprised about 15% of the electorate). Exit polls indicate that Hillary Clinton won 55% of voters 18-29, a drop from the 60% of young voters that Barack Obama carried in 2012. Although both Obama and Clinton lost the white youth vote. Obama lost the white youth vote to Romney in 2012 44% to 51% and Clinton to Trump 43% to 47% according to exit polls.

In this report we use data gathered from surveys fielded in the weeks before the election to contextualize who we believe went to the polls and what issues and messages motivated them to go. While exit polls are important in terms of giving us an initial snapshot of who voted and for which candidate, they lack the information necessary to dive deeper into the ideas, issues and contradictions that help to explain election outcomes. We also pay particular attention to the critical importance of race and ethnicity in Millennial voting behavior in 2016, a defining issue in this year's presidential election. Our data helps to answer the important questions of why support for Hillary Clinton was down compared to support for Barack Obama and starts the critical task of assessing to what degree narratives of race and racism versus economic vulnerability helped to drive the white youth vote for Donald Trump.

Table 1 presents the raw data of voting preferences among all young adults in 2016 across race and ethnicity gathered in our survey fielded just before the election.

⁴ See <http://civicyouth.org/an-estimated-24-million-young-people-vote-in-2016-election/>

Consistent with the data we have been collecting since June, there were large differences across race and ethnicity in candidate preference among Millennials on the eve of the 2016 election. **A majority of all African Americans (58%) and Asian Americans (56%) said that they planned to vote for Hillary Clinton in November,** compared to a plurality of 47% of Latino/as and 31% of whites.

Table 1: Support for the 2016 Presidential Candidates among All Young Adults

	African American adults 18-30	Asian American adults 18-30	Latino/a adults 18-30	Non- Hispanic white adults 18-30	All Adults 18-30
Hillary Clinton	58	56	47	31	40
Donald Trump	3	9	9	28	18
Gary Johnson	3	6	5	11	8
Jill Stein	4	3	4	4	4
Someone else	7	3	6	5	5
Probably not vote	17	15	17	14	15
Undecided	8	6	11	8	8
<i>N</i> =	522	273	503	514	1,843

Question: If the 2016 presidential election were between Hillary Clinton for the Democrats and Donald Trump for the Republicans, would you vote for Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, someone else, or probably not vote? *N* = 1,843. Column entries may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Over the last month of the campaign, our data show a substantial tightening of vote preference among white youth. In the survey we fielded during the first two weeks of October, white youth favored Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump by 14 percentage points.⁵ In our last survey before the election, fielded between October 20th and November 3rd, we find a much narrower three percentage point advantage for Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump among white youth. This movement of many young whites towards Donald Trump over the last weeks of the campaign suggests that there may have been a substantial shift from undecided, third-party voters, and Clinton leaners to Trump among white Millennials in the last stages of the campaign.

⁵ See our report on the first October survey here:
<http://genforwardsurvey.com/assets/uploads/2016/10/Horse-Race-Report--Final.pdf>

The data also reinforce our previous finding that young Latino/as are less supportive of Hillary Clinton than other Millennials of color. While Latino/a youth were central to the Obama coalition in 2008 and 2012, when 76% and 74% of young Latino/a voters, respectively, voted for Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton struggled to win the same level of support from this critical group of young people. **Latino/a Millennials in our survey did not support Hillary Clinton at the same rate as other youth of color in the 2016 election. This trend, we believe, helps to explain Clinton’s underperformance with the “Obama coalition,” or the group of voters, especially young voters of color, that turned out in record numbers to elect (and then re-elect) President Obama.**

Youth Vote among Likely Voters⁶

In Table 2 we present the voting preferences of likely young voters (including who they were leaning towards if undecided). By likely voters we mean those individuals who expressed a great deal of interest in voting in 2016 and who have a history of voting in elections. In general, we believe that the voting preferences of likely voters we identify in our sample will most closely resemble the actual youth vote in 2016. **Indeed, we find that 58% of young likely voters in our sample said they were planning to vote for Hillary Clinton, a number that is very close to the 55% of youth support that exit polls indicate went to Clinton.**

⁶ Our likely voter models are based on guidelines developed by the Pew research center. We ask respondents a series of four questions about their likelihood of voting in November, their interest in news about the election, their history of voting in the 2012 presidential election, and how often they typically vote. We use responses to these questions to help determine who is a “likely” voter come November 8th. Those who say they definitely will not vote to Question 7 or who say they probably will not vote to Question 1 are automatically coded as unlikely voters. We then create a scale combining these four questions, and coding those who were not eligible to vote in-between those who did vote and those who did not. We then draw cut-offs based on estimates of voting rates in 2012 from CIRCLE’s tabulation of the Current Population Survey Voting and Registration supplement to determine the number of likely voters in each racial and ethnic group (see, http://civicyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CIRCLE_2013FS_outhVoting2012FINAL.pdf, page 5). Data from the 2012 CPS shows that 54% of African Americans, 46% of Whites, 36% of Asian Americans, and 37% of Latino/as 18-29 voted in 2012. We assume that voting rates will be similar in 2016. Therefore, we code African Americans and Whites in the top 50% of our scale as “likely” voters, and top 36% of Latino/as and Asian Americans as likely voters. Using these cut-offs gives us a total voter turnout rate of approximately 45% among young voters 18-30.

Unlike Clinton, our estimates for young adult support of Donald Trump do not come as close to reported exit poll data. Our surveys indicated that 23% of young likely voters would vote for Trump, while the exit polls suggest that approximately 37% of young adults voted for Donald Trump. In short, our surveys—like many others out there—underestimated support for Donald Trump.⁷

Table 2: Support for the 2016 Presidential Candidates among Likely Voters, Including Leaners

	African American adults 18-30	Asian American adults 18-30	Latino/a adults 18-30	Non-Hispanic white adults 18-30	All Adults 18-30
Hillary Clinton	84	76	70	46	58
Donald Trump	3	7	10	34	23
Gary Johnson	3	10	4	12	9
Jill Stein	3	3	9	5	5
Someone else	6	2	4	2	3
<i>N</i> =	287	130	201	263	843


Question: If the 2016 presidential election were between Hillary Clinton for the Democrats and Donald Trump for the Republicans, would you vote for Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, someone else, or probably not vote? *N* = 881. Column entries may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Figure 1 below contrasts our estimates of the percentage of young white, African American, and Latino/a likely voters who indicate an intention to vote for Donald Trump compared to estimates of Donald Trump voters from exit polls of 18-29 year olds.⁸ As Figure 1 shows, our data underrepresent support for Donald Trump, at least compared to the exit poll data

⁷ Of course, exit polls do not perfectly represent voter preferences either but provide another tool for helping understand elections.

⁸ The exit poll data does not include estimates of the Asian American youth vote to provide a similar comparison.

Figure 1. Comparison of Support for Donald Trump in GenForward Late October Survey (among likely voters) to Exit Poll Data




This disjuncture between the number of young people who said they voted for Trump in the exit polls and the much smaller number who indicate they would be voting for Trump in our sample must be addressed. Like many pollsters, we are reviewing our sample structure, models and general assumptions to figure out why we were off on our Trump estimation. We believe there may be a few reasons that we missed the mark. First, is the idea of non-response bias, or namely the possibility that the people who choose not to participate in our survey are markedly different from those who answered our survey. Non-response bias may have resulted in the omission of people who were likely to support Donald Trump. Consistent with standard practices, we weighted our sample to make it representative of the entire United States, paying attention to indicators such as race, gender, and education, but it is possible that even with such precautions not enough of those who were inclined to support Trump made it into our sample. Another possible explanation is that those who voted for Trump either changed their mind during the last days of the campaign or preferred not to tell/admit they were voting for Trump and so told our interviewers that they would vote for someone else when we asked. In this case we have to ensure moving forward

that we structure our questions in a way that respondents feel comfortable expressing their true feeling about any candidate or issue under examination.⁹

Despite the difficulties we encountered in accurately estimating Trump support among Millennials, our survey data is much more consistent with the exit polls estimating youth support for Hillary Clinton, presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Comparison of Support for Hillary Clinton in Second GenForward October Survey (among likely voters) to Exit Poll Data




The Obama Coalition

One narrative that is emerging about the election is that Hillary Clinton lost in part because she failed to capture the Obama coalition of young voters that catapulted President Obama to the White House in 2008 and 2012. For example, Obama’s coalition in 2012 was rooted much more strongly in young voters of color, as 91% of African Americans, 74% of Latino/as, and 86% of Asian American youth voted for Barack Obama in 2012.

⁹ While our estimates of the Trump vote were off somewhat we stand by all of data and feel confident of the findings we detail in this report. That said, we will continue to review and refine our work here at GenForward as we build the best data gathering platform on Millennials, especially young adults of color.

In Figure 3 below we present a comparison of youth support for President Obama (based on 2012 exit poll data) compared to youth support for Hillary Clinton (using the above likely voter estimates from the second October GenForward survey). Based on our pre-election survey data, Hillary Clinton did not do as well among our likely voters of color, with 84% of the African American likely vote, 70% of the Latino/a likely vote, and 76% of the Asian American likely vote. Hillary Clinton did, however, do about as well among our likely young whites (46%) as Barack Obama did in 2012 (44%).

Figure 3. Comparison of the Youth Obama Coalition in 2012 to the Youth Clinton Coalition in 2016



While the data in Figure 3 indicate that Hillary Clinton was poised to do slightly worse among young voters of color in 2016 than Barack Obama in 2012 (or 2008, for that matter), it also clearly shows that Hillary Clinton in 2016—like Barack Obama in 2012—would win large majorities of African American, Asian American, and Latino/a youth likely voters.

Third-Party Candidates

Finally, support for third-party candidates were poised to play less of a role than some early media reports assumed in the likely youth vote in 2016.¹⁰ In our sample, relatively small percentages of African American (6%), Latino/a (13%), Asian Americans (13%), and white (17%) likely voters planned to vote for Gary Johnson or Jill Stein on the eve of the election. Exit poll data indicate that eight percent of African Americans, nine percent of whites and six percent of Latino/as reported voting for someone other than Clinton and Trump for president. As we reported previously, **youth support for third-party candidates has been exaggerated in some other polls which estimated that as many as one-third to 44% of young adults would vote for a third-party candidate. These estimates were made from samples that contain only limited numbers of young adults. We find, instead, that most of the interest in our sample for voting for a third-party candidate like Johnson came from young whites.**

Vote Choice of Bernie Sanders Supporters

In the post-election commentary, some are asking whether Bernie Sanders supporters came around to support Hillary Clinton in the 2016 elections. In Table 3 we present the vote intentions of Millennials who said they supported Bernie Sanders in the 2016 presidential primary. As Table 3 shows, many African American (49%), Asian Americans (68%), Latino/a (60%) and white (54%) Sanders supporters said that they planned to vote for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 elections. In contrast, support for Trump among Bernie Sanders supporters is in the low single-digits for each racial and ethnic group.

While many Sanders supporters said they were planning to support Hillary Clinton, substantial numbers also indicated they would not support her for the presidency. For example, 47% of African Americans, 44% of whites, 37% of Latino/as, and 29% of Asian Americans who supported Bernie Sanders in the primary said that they would either vote for a third-party candidate or not vote in the 2016 elections rather than support Hillary Clinton. This represents a substantial number of potential Democratic voters who said they did not plan on supporting the Democratic Party's candidate in 2016.

¹⁰ For example, a September Quinnipiac poll indicated—based on a small sample of young adults—that more than 40% of Millennials were supporting a third-party candidate (see, See <https://www.qu.edu/news-and-events/quinnipiac-university-poll/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2378>)

This data suggests that the fractures within the Democratic Party between the Sanders and Clinton camps possibly contributed to Clinton’s diminished support from young voters or reduced turnout among young people who otherwise may have been supportive of a Democratic presidential nominee.

Table 3. Bernie Sanders Supporters’ Vote Intention, Including Leaners

	African American adults 18-30	Asian American adults 18-30	Latino/a adults 18-30	Non- Hispanic white adults 18-30	All Adults 18-30
Hillary Clinton	49	68	60	54	56
Donald Trump	4	2	2	3	3
Gary Johnson	5	9	5	11	8
Jill Stein	7	5	8	11	9
Someone else	11	7	8	8	8
Will probably not vote	24	8	16	14	15
N=	244	142	265	194	858

Question: If the general election were held today, and the candidates were Hillary Clinton for the Democrats, Donald Trump for the Republicans, Gary Johnson for the Libertarian Party, and Jill Stein for the Green Party, for whom would you vote? *N* = 858. Column entries may not equal 100% due to rounding.

In the appendix, we provide further analyses about how young adult support for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump varied across additional demographic characteristics such as sex, education, income, employment status, and age. We turn now to consider how other prominent factors such as white vulnerability, racial resentment, and modern sexism possibly affected the youth vote in 2016.

IV. White Vulnerability, Racial Resentment, Modern Sexism and the Youth Vote in 2016

In this section we delve deeper into the forces driving Millennials' voting decisions in the 2016 election. As we mentioned earlier, our data were gathered just before the election so we cannot confirm whether our respondents voted or for whom. Instead, we can use our data to explore what factors, issues or beliefs might explain why some Millennials in our sample indicated they planned to vote for specific candidates. We focus on three factors that many analysts and commentators have identified as central to voting—especially voting among whites—in this election: racial resentment, sexism, and perceptions of white vulnerability.

Understanding Support for Donald Trump among Young Whites

Numerous commentators have suggested that some white voters were motivated to vote for Donald Trump in particular because of these three factors—racism,¹¹ sexism¹² or the idea that white Americans are increasingly in a vulnerable position regarding both their economic positioning and general status in society.¹³ We examine whether and how each of these factors might be related to candidate preference in our pre-election survey. Specifically, we are interested in the role perceived white vulnerability played

¹¹ “Yes, half of Trump supporters are racist”, *Washington Post*, September 12, 2016 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/clinton-wasnt-wrong-about-the-deplorables-among-trumps-supporters/2016/09/12/93720264-7932-11e6-beac-57a4a412e93a_story.html?utm_term=.dee2d29f4df5);

“Trump’s win is a reminder of the incredible, unbeatable power of racism”, *Vox*, November 9, 2016 (<http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/9/13571676/trump-win-racism-power>).

¹² “Will sexism be the US presidential election’s November surprise? Here’s what we found”, *Washington Post*, October 20, 2016 (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/20/will-sexism-be-the-u-s-presidential-elections-november-surprise-we-checked-heres-what-we-found/>); “Why we don’t know how much sexism is hurting Hillary Clinton’s campaign”, *FiveThirtyEight*, November 5, 2016 (<http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-we-dont-know-how-much-sexism-is-hurting-clintons-campaign/>).

¹³ “Donald Trump’s crucial pillar of support, white men, shows weakness”, *New York Times*, August 18, 2016 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/us/politics/donald-trump-white-men.html>); “How Trump Won: The Revenge of Working Class Whites”, *Washington Post*, November 9, 2016 (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/09/how-trump-won-the-revenge-of-working-class-whites/>).

in helping to shape the vote of white Millennials. To explore this, we created a set of questions to measure perceptions of white vulnerability. The first question asks respondents whether they believe being white helps, hurts, or makes no difference in today's society. The second question asks whether —through no fault of their own— whites are economically losing ground today compared to other racial and ethnic groups. The third question asks whether discrimination against whites is today as big a problem as discrimination against Blacks and other minorities.¹⁴ We use all three measures to comprise a scale we call the **white vulnerability scale**.

In trying to explain the outcome of the election and the surprising level of support for Donald Trump, some have argued that racism, especially among the white working-class, drove those communities to vote for Donald Trump. To explore this claim we look at the impact of racial resentment, measured by levels of agreement or disagreement with the following two statements: (1) Blacks should work their way up without any special favors, and (2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. As other scholars have documented,¹⁵ these questions reflect a belief system that blacks no longer face discrimination, have a poor work ethic, and that they are therefore undeserving of government benefits.¹⁶ If racial resentment helps drive the Trump vote, we would expect that individuals who score highly on the racial resentment scale might also be more likely to say they plan to vote for Donald Trump.

Finally, we also want to account for the role sexism might play in vote choice. Some voters refused to support Hillary Clinton in part because she was a woman, believing that a woman is not able to serve as president. To measure sexism, we asked respondents three questions from a scale designed to measure “modern sexism.”¹⁷ The questions ask respondents their level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements: (1) “Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination,” (2) “Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for

¹⁴ These three questions about white vulnerability are highly correlated with each other and a scale based on these three questions has a high alpha reliability score ($\alpha = 0.74$ among whites).

¹⁵ See, e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2003.

¹⁶ The two racial resentment questions are highly correlated and a scale based on these two questions has a high alpha reliability score ($\alpha = 0.72$ among whites).

¹⁷ See, e.g., Swim et al. 1995.

achievement,” and (3) “It is easy to understand why women’s groups are still concerned about societal limitations of women’s opportunities.” This measure of sexist attitudes reflects a denial of gender-based discrimination and an opposition to demands and policies designed to promote gender equality.¹⁸ Our measures for both racial resentment and modern sexism are adopted from previous research and the specific question wordings are available in the toplines.¹⁹

For whites, we examine the relationship between each of these attitudes and intention to vote for Donald Trump (relative to support for Clinton, a third party candidate, or being unlikely to vote). We also examine vote intention for Hillary Clinton among whites (relative to support for Trump, a third party candidate, or being not likely to vote). However, because so few young adults of color express an intent to vote for Trump, we analyze their support **only** for Hillary Clinton.²⁰ To measure candidate support in the analyses below, we combine those who report an intention to vote for Donald Trump with those who are leaning towards voting for Trump as “Trump supporters,” and compare them to those respondents who express a vote intention for any of the other candidates or express a lack of interest in voting in 2016. For Millennials of color, we examine support for Hillary Clinton (combining those who express an intention to vote for Clinton with those who are leaning towards voting for Clinton), relative to those who support any of the other candidates or express a lack of interest in voting in the election.

In our analyses we examine how each of our highlighted factors—white vulnerability, racial resentment and modern sexism—are related to candidate support among all young adults in our sample, as we do not have a validated measure of voter turnout to decisively distinguish voters from non-voters. We limit our presentation in figures below **only to results that are statistically significant (p<0.10)**, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

When we consider racial resentment, modern sexism, and white vulnerability separately, we find that each of these factors is strongly associated with support for

¹⁸ The three modern sexism questions are highly correlated and a scale based on these three questions has a high alpha reliability score ($\alpha = 0.82$ among whites).

¹⁹ Toplines are available at genforwardsurvey.com


²⁰ Because there are so few respondents of color who intend to vote or are leaning towards voting for Donald Trump in our sample, we cannot get reliable estimates of the factors affecting support for Donald Trump among African Americans, Latino/as, and Asian Americans.

Donald Trump among young whites. We used regression analyses to model respondents' support for Trump while including each of these variables in separate models while also controlling for partisanship, ideology, and demographics. Based on these analysis, Figure 4 shows the probability that a white respondent supported Donald Trump at low (shown in blue) and high (shown in orange) values of white vulnerability, racial resentment, and modern sexism.²¹

As Figure 4 shows, the probability of supporting Donald Trump is 0.06 for young whites at low values of the white vulnerability scale, compared to 0.52 for white Millennials at high values of the white vulnerability scale. Thus, respondents with high levels of white vulnerability were estimated to be about 46 percentage points more likely to support Trump than respondents with low levels of white vulnerability. Similarly, the probability of Trump support is 0.08 for whites at low values of the racial resentment scale, compared to 0.35 for whites at high values of the racial resentment scale. Finally, we find a 0.11 probability of support for Trump among whites at low values of the modern sexism scale, compared to a 0.42 probability for whites at high values of modern sexism who plan to vote for Trump.

²¹ Specifically, these predicted probabilities were generated while holding all the demographic and political control variables at their mean values, while white vulnerability, racial resentment, and modern sexism were at their minimum and maximum values.

Figure 4. Probability of White Intention to Vote for Donald Trump at Low and High Values of White Vulnerability, Racial Resentment, and Modern Sexism (when analyzed separately)



While these three variables when analyzed separately help explain Trump’s appeal to young white voters, what we believe is especially important is that perceptions of white vulnerability overwhelms elements of both racial resentment and sexism when analyzed together. Specifically, our measures show that white vulnerability is correlated very highly with both racial resentment²² and modern sexism.²³ This means that individuals who score higher on levels of white vulnerability also score higher on levels of racial resentment and modern sexism. Thus, whites who perceive their racial group as especially vulnerable today also tend to be resentful of African Americans and to have sexist attitudes about women.

A dominant narrative in the press since Trump’s surprising electoral showing has focused on perceptions among whites that they have been left out and left behind. Trump’s campaign slogan to “Make America Great Again” is said to have appealed to white Americans, in particular, who feel like they have lost their status in the U.S. The

²² Pearson’s R correlation coefficient between white vulnerability and racial resentment is 0.71 among whites.

²³ Pearson’s R correlation coefficient between white vulnerability and modern sexism is 0.49 among whites.


question that remains unresolved is whether the appeal to making America great again is largely an economic or racial appeal or if white vulnerability, as we find, has multiple dimensions, including perceptions of racial, sexist **and** economic vulnerability. Thus, if white vulnerability is associated with vote choice separately from racial resentment and modern sexism, we would expect that racial resentment and modern sexism would continue to show a strong association with vote choice when considering all three factors *simultaneously*. However, if white vulnerability inherently contains dimensions of racial and sexist resentment then we would expect to see those variables decrease in impact when considered in the same model with white vulnerability. Such an outcome would suggest that the association between white vulnerability and Trump support cannot be understood without acknowledging how perceptions of white vulnerability are linked to both racism and sexism.

In Figure 5 we present the statistically significant results from an analysis that examines how candidate preference is associated with white vulnerability, racial resentment, and modern sexism when accounting for each factor simultaneously along with the control variables named earlier. What we find in this analysis is very interesting. Specifically, both racial resentment and modern sexism are no longer statistically significant when included in a model with white vulnerability, and the association between each of these factors and Trump support declines substantially. **White vulnerability largely washes out the effects of racial resentment and modern sexism, suggesting that white vulnerability includes dimensions of racial resentment and sexism.**

Thus, when we consider all three factors together only white vulnerability continues to have a statistically significant and sizeable effect on support for Donald Trump in this analysis. As Figure 5 shows, the probability of Trump support is 0.09 among whites at low values of white vulnerability, compared to 0.44 percent for whites at high values of the white vulnerability scale. Even when controlling for racial resentment and modern sexism, individuals with high levels of perceived white vulnerability are about 33 percentage points more likely to vote for Trump than individuals with low levels of white vulnerability. Moreover, white vulnerability largely crowds out the direct effects of racial resentment and modern sexism in young whites' intent to vote for Donald Trump. Neither of these variables are statistically significant, and the magnitudes of their substantive importance are smaller than when they are analyzed separately. Thus, perceived white vulnerability appears to be a crucial factor motivating whites to support Donald Trump. But these results also suggest that white vulnerability is highly bound up among whites with feelings of racial resentment and modern sexism. Thus,

Trump’s appeal is not exclusively rooted in economic populism or white nationalism or even modern sexism, but is a blend of all three that is manifested in a feeling among some whites—even those who are Millennials—of economic and social vulnerability.

Figure 5. Probability of White Intention to Vote for Donald Trump at Low and High Values of White Vulnerability (when also controlling for Racial Resentment and Modern Sexism)



Thus, while many analysts have focused separately on economic anxiety, racial resentment, or modern sexism, our findings suggest that our new measure of white vulnerability encapsulate and override each of these individual factors and is crucial to understanding white support for Donald Trump.

Specifically, we cannot distinguish Donald Trump’s appeal to white nationalism from economic populism. **Our results suggest that his economic populism message is heard by at least white millennials as an economic message infused with racism and sexism, even when those words are not spoken directly by president-elect Trump.**


Hillary Clinton

A similar but negative pattern of results emerges in our analysis of white youth support for Hillary Clinton. When analyzed separately, both white vulnerability and racial resentment—but surprisingly not modern sexism—have a statistically significant

negative effect on intention for vote for Hillary Clinton. We present these results in Figure 6 below.

As Figure 6 shows, the probability a respondent who scores low on our white vulnerability supported Hillary Clinton is 0.43, compared with 0.2 among respondents who scored high on the white vulnerability measure. Thus, increased feelings of white vulnerability decreased predicted support for Clinton by about 23 percentage points among respondents who are otherwise similar. Likewise, **increased scores on the racial resentment scale are associated with a fifteen percentage point decrease in the probability of supporting Hillary Clinton.** As we noted, the modern sexism scale has no statistical association with vote intention for Hillary Clinton.

Figure 6. Probability of White Intention to Vote for Hillary Clinton at Low and High Values of White Vulnerability and Racial Resentment (when analyzed separately)




When we consider all three variables simultaneously in a model of Clinton support, none of the variables are statistically significant. However, this is largely because the three variables are so highly correlated and because white vulnerability has a stronger effect on positive Trump attitudes than negative attitudes towards Clinton. **In sum, we believe that feelings of white vulnerability are uniquely a predictor of candidate support for Donald Trump among young whites, and does not resonate with Millennials of color.** To examine this possibility, we also analyzed the effects of

white vulnerability, racial resentment, and modern sexism on support for Hillary Clinton among young adults of color. Our findings are reported below.

Among African Americans, we find no evidence that white vulnerability, racial resentment, or modern sexism—considered simultaneously along with the control variables outlined earlier—are related to support for Hillary Clinton. Thus, as expected, young African Americans’ support for Hillary is not affected by feelings that whites are increasingly vulnerable, racial resentment, nor modern sexism.

Among Latino/a Millennials, racial resentment significantly decreased support for Hillary Clinton, while neither white vulnerability nor modern sexism had a statistically significant impact. Figure 7 presents the predicted probability of support for Clinton among Latino/as across levels of racial resentment while controlling for white vulnerability and modern sexism, as well as party identification, ideology, age, gender, education, and income. The predicted probability of Latino/a support for Hillary Clinton is 0.63 for Latino/as at low values of racial resentment, while the probability is only 0.37 for Latino/as at high values of racial resentment. Thus, increased values of racial resentment decreased the predicted probability of supporting Clinton by about 26 percentage points. These findings suggest that racial resentment against African Americans played an important role in diminishing Latino/as support for the Democratic nominee for president.

Figure 7. Probability of Latino/a Intention to Vote for Hillary Clinton at Low and High Values of Racial Resentment



Finally, among Asian Americans we find that neither white vulnerability, modern sexism, nor racial resentment are significantly related to Clinton support, when considering all variables simultaneously and also controlling for party identification, ideology, age, gender, education, and income.²⁴

These analyses provide some important insights into the young adult vote in 2016. For Latino/as, we find that racial resentment is strongly and negatively related to intent to vote for Hillary Clinton in the election. High levels of racial resentment decreased Clinton's support among Latino/as. Regarding support for Hillary Clinton among African American and Asian American young adults, there is no relationship between white vulnerability, racial resentment and modern sexism and the vote intention of these two groups of Millennials.

For whites, feelings of vulnerability stand out as a prominent factor driving support for Donald Trump. Feelings of white vulnerability appear to capture a mixture of economic anxiety, racial resentment, and modern sexism for white Millennials. Thus, reports that discussed Donald Trump's economic populism and white nationalism may

²⁴ However, among Asian Americans racial resentment is close to being a significant predictor of Clinton support ($b = -2.34$, $p < 0.11$).

have missed their joint contribution to something larger, namely whites' perception of general vulnerability across numerous domains. Trump's message seems to have appealed in particular to young whites who perceive a threat to their status and position. We should, therefore, not consider racial resentment, sexism, and economic anxiety as separate theories related to white support for Donald Trump, but rather as components of a larger sense of vulnerability in today's increasingly racially and ethnically diverse and economically competitive society. And while some might stereotypically expect that white vulnerability would shape the political preferences of a white middle-aged man who lost his manufacturing job, we find a significant impact of white vulnerability on the articulated vote choice of white Millennials.

V. Political Alienation, Feelings Toward President Obama, Political Equality and Millennial Voting Behavior in the 2016 Election

While much attention has been paid to trying to unpack the Trump victory on November 8th, less attention has been focused on understanding what factors mobilized Clinton voters. In this section we focus on three additional factors that we speculate are significantly related to Millennials' vote choice, especially a vote choice for Hillary Clinton. Specifically, we examine the impact of feelings of political alienation, attitudes toward the incumbent president Barack Obama, and perceptions of political equality in American society on young adults' support for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. While less attention has been paid to these factors in explaining voting preferences, at least relative to the factors highlighted in the last section—economic anxiety, racial resentment, and sexism—we think that feelings of alienation, attitudes toward President Obama, and feelings of political equality are important to understanding Millennial vote intention, especially among youth of color.

As was widely noted throughout the campaign, one of Hillary Clinton's primary strategies was to remind voters, especially voters of color, of her close relationship with the President and her plan to extend his policy agenda and wins. Unlike some other presidents at the end of their second terms, President Obama has especially widespread approval from democrats and young voters of color. We speculate that warm feelings towards President Obama might spillover into support for Hillary Clinton. To assess if our hypothesis is correct, we first identify a measure of feelings towards President Obama. We use a feeling thermometer that asks respondents to "please rate [Barack Obama] on a scale from 0-100 to represent feelings toward President Obama. Ratings between 50 and 100 mean that you feel favorably and warmly towards that person. Ratings between 0 and 50 mean that you feel cool and don't care much for that person. A 50-degree rating means that you are in the middle."

Figure 8. Mean Feelings Towards President Obama across Race and Ethnicity




Figure 8 above presents the mean value of feelings towards President Obama across racial and ethnic groups. As Figure 8 shows, the mean value of feelings towards President Obama is 81 for African Americans, 68 for Asian Americans, 69 for Latino/as, and 51 for whites.

While many young adults feel warmly towards President Obama specifically, many also feel alienated from America's political system. We got a sense of this in July when we asked respondents whether the two major parties do an adequate job representing the American people, or whether a third party is needed. Majorities of African Americans (66%), Asian Americans (71%), Latino/as (68%), and whites (73%) said that a third party is needed. This suggests that many young people feel like political leaders and institutions do not look out for them. We speculate that feelings of political alienation might have two different effects. First, higher levels of political alienation might decrease interest in voting for Clinton or Trump, since young voters might feel like the entire system and the two prominent party candidates are just part of a system that is stacked against them. Second, elevated levels of alienation might lead Millennials, especially white Millennials, to choose Donald Trump as their preferred candidate, the candidate that promised to "drain the swamp" of Washington and politics as usual.

We measure political alienation with a scale based on three questions that gets at a broad sense of distance from government and politicians, not just alienation from the two major parties. The first question asks respondents the extent to which they agree that “politics today are no longer able to meet that challenges our country is facing.” The second question asks respondents their level of agreement with the statement, “the leaders in government care very little about people like me.” The third question asks their agreement with the statement that “the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves and their friends.” Together, these three questions capture a broad sense of hostility towards and detachment from government and politicians.²⁵

The final driver of voting behavior in 2016 that we analyze in this section is feelings of political equality. Our measure of political equality captures differences in perceptions that American society and government treats and values all groups equally. We expect that higher feelings of political equality will increase young adults—perhaps especially young adults of color—support for Hillary Clinton, since she ran a campaign that emphasized the ideas of equality and togetherness.

We use four questions to measure perceptions of political equality. All four questions ask respondents their level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements: (1) “In the United States, everyone has an equal chance to succeed,” (2) “Generally the American legal system treats all groups equally,” (3) “In the United States each person’s vote is counted and valued equally,” and (4) “Generally, I feel like a full and equal citizen in this country with all the rights and protections that other people have.” These four questions capture an optimistic perception that American society and government provides equal opportunities for all groups and individuals and that largely the country is on the right track regarding these issues.²⁶

Like in the previous section, we model the relationship between each of these three variables and vote intention in the 2016 elections. For whites, we examine both support for Clinton (relative to support for Trump, a third party candidate, or being not likely to


²⁵ The three political alienation questions are highly correlated and a scale based on these three questions has a reasonable alpha reliability score ($\alpha = 0.67$ across all respondents).

²⁶ The four political equality questions are highly correlated and a scale based on these four questions has a reasonable alpha reliability score ($\alpha = 0.76$ across all respondents).

vote) and support for Trump (relative to support for Clinton, a third party candidate, or being unlikely to vote) separately. Because so few young adults of color indicated support for Donald Trump, we limit our analysis of African American, Asian American, and Latino/a vote intention to support for Hillary Clinton. We highlight any statistically significant relationships we find between political alienation, feelings towards President Obama, and political equality among all racial and ethnic groups in support for the candidates.

We first examine how each of these variables is related to candidate support among African Americans. In Figure 9 below, we present the predicted probability that a respondent supported Hillary Clinton at low and high values of **the Obama feeling thermometer and the political equality scale, both of which are statistically significant predictors of Clinton support among African Americans**. We do not display the impact of political alienation since it was not shown to be statistically significant in our analysis of African Americans' support for Clinton.

Figure 9. Probability of African American Intent to Vote for Hillary Clinton at Low and High Values of Feelings towards President Obama and Political Equality




As Figure 9 shows, the predicted probability that an African American respondent supported Hillary Clinton increased from 0.3 to 0.67 as they expressed increasingly

warm feelings toward Obama. Likewise, African American respondents with high scores on the political equality scale were about 36 percentage points more likely to support Clinton than respondents with low scores on the political equality scale. Thus, both warm or positive feelings towards President Obama and perceptions of political equality have a very large effect on African American support for Hillary Clinton.

We next consider the roles of political alienation, political equality, and feelings towards Barack Obama on Latino/as support for Hillary Clinton. Our analysis indicates that, in contrast with the analysis of African American support, perceptions of political equality were not a statistically significant predictor of vote intention among Latino/as. Instead, feelings of **political alienation and warmth towards Barack Obama were important to Latino/as' support for Hillary Clinton**. Figure 10 below presents the change in predicted probability of supporting Hillary Clinton among Latino/as at low and high values of the measure of Obama feelings and the political alienation scale.

More favorable evaluations of Obama were associated with increased support for Clinton among Latino/as. As Figure 10 shows, Latino/a respondents with cool feelings toward Obama were about 0.34 likely to support Clinton, while an otherwise similar respondent who felt warmly toward Obama had a 0.6 probability of supporting Clinton. We also find that increased political alienation reduced support for Clinton. Latino/as with high levels of alienation were about 28 percentage points less likely to support Clinton than Latino/as with low levels of alienation.

Figure 10. Probability of Latino/a Intent to Vote for Hillary Clinton at Low and High Values of Feelings towards President Obama and Political Alienation




Thus, we find that young Latino/as who believe that the political system and politicians in particular do not advance their interests are less likely to vote for Hillary Clinton, a candidate who was routinely identified as part of the political establishment. In sum, Clinton’s support was strongest among Latino/as with the warmest feelings toward Barack Obama and among those with lowest perceived levels of political alienation.

Like Latino/as, we find that both **political alienation and feelings toward President Obama were central to understanding support for Hillary Clinton among Asian Americans**. And again like Latino/as our measure of political equality was not statistically significant for Asian American vote intention. Figure 11 presents the difference in predicted support for Hillary Clinton among respondents whose feelings toward Obama were relatively cool and relatively warm and at low and high levels of perceived political alienation.

The figure shows that warm feelings toward President Obama among Asian American respondents increased the predicted probability of supporting Clinton from 0.19 to 0.67, or about 48 percentage points. We also find that respondents with higher levels of political alienation – and who may have felt the system is “rigged” – were less likely to

support Hillary Clinton, as the predicted probability of support decreased from 0.75 to 0.43.

Figure 11. Probability of Asian American Intent to Vote for Hillary Clinton at the Low and High Values of Feelings towards President Obama and Political Alienation



Finally, we consider the effect of each of these variables on support for both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump among young whites. The statistically significant results ($p < 0.10$) are presented in Figure 12 below.

Figure 12 shows that the same measures that proved to be significant for African Americans are also significant in explaining vote intention for Hillary Clinton among whites. Feelings toward Obama were an exceptionally strong indicator of support for Clinton among young whites. Respondents with relatively cool feelings toward Obama had a predicted probability of supporting Clinton of 0.02, while this figure increased to 0.54 among respondents with relatively warm feelings toward Obama. Thus, warm feelings among Obama increased support among young whites by about 52 percentage points. Strikingly, the relationship between attitudes toward Obama and Clinton support is stronger for young whites than it is for young people of color. The figure also shows that increased political alienation was associated with greater support for Clinton among young whites. The probability of Clinton support is 0.24 for whites with

low values of political equality, compared to 0.43 for those with high values of political equality.

Figure 12. Probability of White Intent to Vote for Hillary Clinton at Low and High Values of Feelings towards President Obama and Political Equality





Figure 13 presents the relationship between feelings towards President Obama at low and high values (the minimum and maximum) and support for Donald Trump. We find large differences between whites at low and whites at high values of feelings towards President Obama and intention to vote for Donald Trump on Election Day. The probability of supporting Trump is 0.39 for whites that have relatively cool feelings toward Obama, but decreases to just 0.08 among otherwise similar young whites who have warm feelings towards the incumbent President.

Figure 13. Probability of White Intent to Vote for Donald Trump at Low and High Values of Feelings towards President Obama



In sum, these analyses indicate that **feelings about President Obama, first and foremost, consistently had a significant influence on support for Hillary Clinton across all racial and ethnic groups.** Individuals with warm feelings towards President Obama were more likely to support Clinton than those with the coldest feelings towards President Obama. Thus, Clinton’s strategy to link herself to President Obama seems to have paid off in terms of increasing the probability of those with warm feelings toward the President turning out to vote for her. The problem with this strategy is that young whites were the group that registered the lowest mean values of warmth toward President Obama—51 compared to 81 for African Americans, 68 for Asian Americans and 69 for Latino/as. So, tying herself to the President may have cost Clinton votes among some white Millennials.

We also found that high levels of perceived political equality increased Clinton’s support among African Americans and whites. It seems that young adults who perceive that American government and society treats all groups and individuals equally were more likely to vote for Hillary Clinton, believing she would protect and continue to advance issues of equality.

Finally, we found that high feelings of political alienation decreased support for Clinton among Latino/as and Asian Americans. Specifically, Clinton did worse among Asian Americans and Latino/as who feel that politics cannot meet our current challenges and who feel that government and politicians care little about people like them. Thus, politicians in the future should be attentive to the influence that feeling alienated from politics can have on the support they receive from young adults, as our study suggests that such perceptions can reduce political support – at least among the growing population of Latino/as and Asian Americans whose support will be increasingly important to the construction of either a new Democratic majority or to a Republican Party that seeks to expand its level of support from young adults of color.

Conclusion

Our analysis in this report is intended to provide insights into whether young voters decided to go to the polls on November 8th and if they did which candidate they supported. While some of our data strays a bit from the exit poll estimates of turnout and vote choice, especially our data on white youth voting for Trump, much of our data, especially that pertaining to young adults of color, seems to be directly on target.

Beyond the predictive accuracy of our data, however, we are most interested in our findings that have to do with white vulnerability, feelings toward the president, perceptions of political equality and feelings of political alienation as drivers of the youth vote. For example, our finding that feelings of white vulnerability appear to capture a mixture of economic anxiety, racial resentment, and modern sexism for white Millennials is an important insight as the country and the political parties struggle to figure out how to move forward. While some would have the Democrats appeal to the white working class with an economic populist message of their own, we would warn the Democrats and others that messages directed only to the white working-class have the high potential to be heard by white voters not only as economic messages but also statements about who is worthy to succeed based on race and sex. Thus, centering whiteness in any appeal, even unwittingly in an economic appeal, may further increase divisions in the country. We encourage politicians, journalists, political pundits and others to review our findings with an eye toward trying to understand the complexities of a youth vote that is growing larger and will shape our politics for years to come.

VI. Survey Methodology

Methodology for Data Presented in Sections 3 and 5

The October GenForward Pre-election survey is a project of the Black Youth Project at the University of Chicago, with The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. Interviews were conducted with a representative sample from GenForwardSM, a nationally representative survey panel of adults ages 18-30 recruited and administered by NORC at the University of Chicago and funded by grants to the Black Youth Project at the University of Chicago from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation.

A total of 1,843 interviews were conducted between October 20 and November 3, 2016 with adults ages 18-30 representing the 50 states and the District of Columbia, including completed interviews with 522 African American young adults, 273 Asian American young adults, 503 Latino/a young adults, 514 white young adults, and 31 young adults with other racial and ethnic backgrounds. The survey was offered in English and Spanish and via telephone and web modes.

The GenForward survey was built from two sample sources:

- Fifty-four percent of the completed interviews are sourced from NORC's AmeriSpeak® Panel. AmeriSpeak is a probability based panel that also uses address-based sample but sourced from the NORC National Frame with enhanced sample coverage. During the initial recruitment phase of the AmeriSpeak panel, randomly selected U.S. households were sampled with a known, non-zero probability of selection and then contacted by U.S. mail, email, telephone, and field interviewers (face-to-face).
- Forty-six percent of the completed interviews are sourced from the Black Youth Project (BYP) panel of young adults recruited by NORC. The BYP sample is from a probability-based household panel that uses an address-based sample from a registered voter database of the entire U.S. Households were selected using

stratified random sampling to support over-sampling of households with African Americans, Latino/as, and Asian Americans ages 18-30. NORC contacted sampled households by U.S. mail and by telephone, inviting them to register and participate in public opinion surveys twice a month.

Panelists on both the BYP and AmeriSpeak panels are invited to register for the panel via the web or by telephone to participate in public opinion surveys.

Of the 1,843 completed interviews in the October 2 GenForward survey, 95 percent were completed by web and 5 percent by telephone. The survey completion rate is 33.4 percent. The weighted household panel recruitment rate is 19.4 percent and the weighted household panel retention rate is 94.8 percent, for a cumulative AAPOR Response Rate 3 of 6.1 percent. The overall margin of sampling error is +/- 3.7 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level, including the design effect. Among subgroups, the margin of sampling error at the 95 percent confidence level is +/- 6.2 percentage points for African Americans, +/- 7.2 percentage points for Asian Americans, +/- 6.4 percentage points for Latino/as, and +/- 5.8 percentage points for whites.

To encourage cooperation, respondents were offered incentives for completing the survey that ranged from the cash-equivalent of \$3 to the cash-equivalent of \$10.

The interviews from the two probability-based sample sources were combined for statistical weighting and analysis. The combined panel samples provide sample coverage of approximately 97% of the U.S. household population. Those excluded from the sample include people with P.O. Box only addresses, some addresses not listed in the USPS Delivery Sequence File, and some newly constructed dwellings. The statistical weights incorporate the appropriate probability of selection for the BYP and AmeriSpeak samples, nonresponse adjustments, and also, raking ratio adjustments to population benchmarks for 18-30 year old adults. A poststratification process is used to adjust for any survey nonresponse as well as any non-coverage or under- and over-sampling resulting from the study-specific sample design. The poststratification process was done separately for each racial/ethnic group and involved the following variables: age, gender, education, and census region. The weighted data, which reflect the U.S. population of adults ages 18-30, and the 18-30 year-old populations for African

Americans, Latino/as, Asian Americans, and non-Latino/a whites, were used for all analyses.

Methodology for Data Presented in Section 4

The Early October GenForward survey is a project of the Black Youth Project at the University of Chicago, with The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. Interviews were conducted with a representative sample from GenForward®, a nationally representative survey panel of adults ages 18-30 recruited and administered by NORC at the University of Chicago and funded by grants to the Black Youth Project at the University of Chicago from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation.

A total of 1,832 interviews were conducted between October 1 and 14, 2016 with adults ages 18-30 representing the 50 states and the District of Columbia, including completed interviews with 520 African American young adults, 257 Asian American young adults, 510 Latino/a young adults, 508 white young adults, and 37 young adults with other racial and ethnic backgrounds. The survey was offered in English and Spanish and via telephone and web modes.

The GenForward survey was built from two sample sources:

- Fifty-two percent of the completed interviews are sourced from NORC's AmeriSpeak® Panel. AmeriSpeak is a probability based panel that also uses address-based sample but sourced from the NORC National Frame with enhanced sample coverage. During the initial recruitment phase of the AmeriSpeak panel, randomly selected U.S. households were sampled with a known, non-zero probability of selection and then contacted by U.S. mail, email, telephone, and field interviewers (face-to-face).
- Forty-eight percent of the completed interviews are sourced from the Black Youth Project (BYP) panel of young adults recruited by NORC. The BYP sample is from a probability-based household panel that uses an address-based sample from a

- registered voter database of the entire U.S. Households were selected using stratified random sampling to support over-sampling of households with African
- Americans, Latino/as, and Asian Americans ages 18-30. NORC contacted sampled households by U.S. mail and by telephone, inviting them to register and participate in public opinion surveys twice a month.

Panelists on both the BYP and AmeriSpeak panels are invited to register for the panel via the web or by telephone to participate in public opinion surveys.

Of the 1,832 completed interviews in the October 1 GenForward survey, 96% were completed by web and 4% by telephone. The survey completion rate is 36 percent. The weighted household panel recruitment rate is 19.4 percent and the weighted household panel retention rate is 94.8 percent, for a cumulative AAPOR Response Rate 3 of 6.6 percent. The overall margin of sampling error is +/- 3.8 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level, including the design effect. Among subgroups, the margin of sampling error at the 95 percent confidence level is +/- 5.9 percentage points for African Americans, +/- 8.9 percentage points for Asian Americans, +/- 6.4 percentage points for Latino/as, and +/- 5.9 percentage points for whites.

To encourage cooperation, respondents were offered incentives for completing the survey that ranged from the cash-equivalent of \$3 to the cash-equivalent of \$10.

The interviews from the two probability-based sample sources were combined for statistical weighting and analysis. The combined panel samples provide sample coverage of approximately 97% of the U.S. household population. Those excluded from the sample include people with P.O. Box only addresses, some addresses not listed in the USPS Delivery Sequence File, and some newly constructed dwellings. The statistical weights incorporate the appropriate probability of selection for the BYP and AmeriSpeak samples, nonresponse adjustments, and also, raking ratio adjustments to population benchmarks for 18-30 year old adults. A poststratification process is used to adjust for any survey nonresponse as well as any non-coverage or under- and over-sampling resulting from the study-specific sample design. The poststratification process was done separately for each racial/ethnic group and involved the following variables:

age, gender, education, and census region. The weighted data, which reflect the U.S. population of adults ages 18-30, and the 18-30 year-old populations for African Americans, Latino/as, Asian Americans, and non-Latino/a whites, were used for all analyses.

VII. Appendix

In the Appendix we present some additional analyses for the interested reader in how the youth vote varied by additional demographic characteristics: sex, education, income, employment status, and age.

Vote Choice, by Race/Ethnicity and Sex


One of the defining accounts about the 2016 election was that it revolved around gender, with women much more supportive of Hillary Clinton and men more supportive of Donald Trump. However, the post-election analysis suggests that this gender gap was not as pronounced as many first expected. Many women, especially white women, voted for Donald Trump and helped secure his election. For example, exit polls indicate that 42% of white women 18-29 voted for Donald Trump compared to only 5% of Black women 18-29 casting a similar vote.

In previous months, we simply found no evidence of a gender gap among potential Millennial voters. Our most recent survey mostly bolsters this finding, with one important exception. As presented in Figure A.1, there are only small and insignificant differences in vote intention for Hillary Clinton across sex among African Americans, Asian Americans, and whites. However, among Latino/as, our data suggest there is a large and significant gender gap in support for Hillary Clinton with likely Latino or male voters far more supportive than Latinas or *women*.²⁷

We would note this finding with some caution, however, as it is not supported by the exit poll data which indicates that 72% of 18-29-year-old Latino/a women and 68% of 18-29-year-old Latino/a men voted for Hillary Clinton. The exit poll data also suggests that our survey overestimates support for Clinton among white males: in the exit polls only 35% of white males said they voted for Hillary Clinton. The exit poll data also shows that 51% of white women in this age group voted for Hillary Clinton, along with 94% of African American women and 71% of African American men.

²⁷ This difference between Latinos and Latinas is significant at $p < 0.01$.

Figure A.1 Vote Intention for Hillary Clinton among likely voters (including leaners), by Race and Sex



Our data does not appear to be especially accurate in terms of the relationship between gender and candidate support in the 2016 elections. For example, our data shows that 28% of white male likely voters intended to vote for Donald Trump, while exit poll data suggests that 54% of white men 18-29 voted for Trump. These results underscore again the challenges survey research had in capturing voting preferences in 2016. As noted above, we intend to look further into the problems behind these discrepancies and work on improving our sample and question wording to more accurately measure voting preferences in the future. We should also note, however, that exit polls are not the last word on who turned out and why. In fact, they too can be inaccurate. So many researchers will be waiting for the more official numbers on this election from the Census Bureau to measure how accurate our estimates were of Millennial turnout and vote choice.

Vote Choice, by Race/Ethnicity and Education

Another lens through which many analysts have interpreted the election results is by education. Less educated whites, in particular, have been portrayed as the base of Donald Trump’s electorate. For example, exit polls suggests that Donald Trump

received more than 50% of the vote among all voters with less than a college degree, but did worse than Clinton among all voters with a college degree or more. Less attention has been paid to the importance of education in the vote choice of young people or people of color. Below we examine whether education affects our estimates of the likely youth vote across all racial and ethnic groups. In general, we would again note some caution in these results as age and education are correlated, such that younger respondents in our sample may be less educated simply because they have had less opportunity to advance their education.

In Figure A.2, we present the percentage of young adult likely voters who planned to vote for Hillary Clinton (compared to those who indicated an intention to vote for Trump, Johnson, Stein, or someone else) across education level. We break education into three categories: no college some college, BA degree or more. As Figure 5 shows, there are important differences across educational level in support for Hillary Clinton. Among African Americans, both the least and the most educated respondents were significantly more likely to vote for Hillary Clinton than respondents with some college education.²⁸ Among Latino/as, support for Hillary Clinton *declines* with education level, such that the strongest Latino/a supporters of Clinton were those Latino/as with no college.²⁹ And for white respondents, support for Hillary Clinton *increases* with education, such that the strongest white supporters of Clinton were more highly educated.³⁰ The differences in support for Clinton among Asian Americans across education level are not statistically significant.

These results suggest that there is no simple correspondence between educational attainment and support for Hillary Clinton in 2016. For whites, Clinton's support increase with formal education. But for Latino/as, her support is highest among those with less formal education. And for African Americans, Clinton's support is highest among *both* those with less and more formal education. **Our data suggests that Clinton's struggles to connect with likely Millennial voters varied by educational**


²⁸ These differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

²⁹ The difference in support for Hillary Clinton between having a BA degree or more and no college among Latino/as is significant at $p < 0.10$.

³⁰ The difference between whites with a BA degree or more and whites with no college is significant at $p < 0.10$ (one-tailed).

group among like voters of color and were especially problematic among young whites with no or some college.


Figure A.2 Support for Hillary Clinton among likely voters (including leaners), by Race and Education



In Figure A.3 we examine the relationship between education and support for Donald Trump (compared to those who indicated an intention to vote for Clinton, Johnson, Stein, or someone else) among young whites (too few young adults of color indicate an intention to vote for Donald Trump to conduct a comparable analysis). Here, the results are consistent with the claim that Trump’s support base seems to decrease as the education level of respondents increases. Specifically, 39% of whites without any college experience said they plan to vote for Donald Trump, compared to 32% of whites with a bachelor’s degree or more. However, the differences across education level in support for Donald Trump that we find among whites are not statistically significant.³¹

³¹ Even though these represent analyses that are designed to be weighted to be representative of the white youth population, only 20% of our white respondents have no college experience. This makes it difficult to get a precise estimate from these respondents.

Figure A.3 Vote Intention for Donald Trump among White likely voters (including leaners), by Race and Education




Vote Choice, by Race/Ethnicity and Income

Much has been written about the possible class divide in this election with many believing that Donald Trump secured his victory by appealing to working-class whites.. However, while exit poll data suggested that Trump did better among less educated voters, the data also showed that Clinton did better than Trump among voters with lower levels of income. For example, Clinton received more than 50% of the vote among *all voters* with incomes less than \$50,000 per year, while Trump did better among individuals at every other (higher) income level.³² Not surprisingly, few if any of the stories published sought to explore if Donald Trump’s message of an economic recovery for the working-class also appealed to working-class millennials Our data allows us to disaggregate these findings by age and by race and ethnicity. Figure A.4 below presents the percentage of young likely voters indicating support for Hillary Clinton across both race/ethnicity and household income.

³² The exit poll data does not include a breakdown of the relationship between income and vote among only 18-29 year olds to conduct a more direct comparison with our data.


Figure A.4 Vote Intention for Hillary Clinton among likely voters (including leaners), by Race and Income



As Figure A.4 shows, we find that there is generally an increase in support for Hillary Clinton across income levels. For each group we find that Clinton receives the greatest support among young people with the highest income incomes. However, most of these differences across income levels are not statistically significant. The only statistically significant difference we observe is between Asian Americans with household income levels greater than \$60,000 per year (84% support for Clinton) compared to Asian Americans with household income between \$25,000-\$60,000 per year (62% support for Clinton).³³ Both of these groups of likely Asian American Millennial voters support Clinton more than Trump, but at relatively different levels. Thus, for young voters, there are not stark differences in support for Hillary Clinton across income levels.

³³ This difference is statistically significant at $p < 0.08$.

Figure A.5 Vote Intention for Donald Trump among White likely voters (including leaners), by Race and Income



In Figure A.5, we present the percentage of likely white Millennial voters who said they would vote for Donald Trump across household income levels. **As these results show, and consistent with the exit poll data among all voters, Trump’s support is actually *weakest* among young white respondents with the lowest household income level.**³⁴ Lower-income white young voters did not provide the bulk of Donald Trump’s electoral support in 2016. Thus, our results suggest that conventional explanations of the 2016 elections focused on class among white voters is complicated when looking at income levels among white young adults. We believe that this analysis and more we will present in the next section, suggests that Trump likely gained support from White Millennials who are not in poverty but may be close enough to poverty that they worry for their future. Specifically, as we detail later in the report, whites who perceive their economic and social status as especially vulnerable right now are the most likely to support Donald Trump. Moreover, those white millennials already in poverty, making less than \$25,000 per year were the least likely to say they planned to vote for Trump. It

³⁴ The difference in support level among those with less than 25k and those in the 25-60k bracket is significant at $p < 0.05$, and the difference between those with less than 25k and those with more than 60k is $p < 0.10$ (one-tailed).

seems these individuals were more likely to believe that Hillary Clinton would improve their economic position.

Vote Choice, by Race/Ethnicity and Employment Status

As a final indicator of class status and vote choice in the 2016 election, we examine differences in voting preference across race/ethnicity and employment status. Figure 9 presents the percentage of likely voters across race/ethnicity and employment status who voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016. Among African Americans, Asian Americans, and whites, we generally find that Clinton received higher levels of support from young people who were unemployed, which suggests that Clinton fared better among young people in these groups who may be experiencing economic hardship. Interestingly, we also find that unemployed Latino/as (61%) expressed less support for Clinton than employed Latino/as (74%). However, differences in support for Clinton are statistically significant only for African Americans. Thus, our data provide limited evidence that employment status was an important predictor of candidate support among other racial and ethnic groups.

Figure A.6 Vote Intention for Hillary Clinton among likely voters (including leaners), by Race and Employment Status




Figure A.7 Vote Intention for Donald Trump among White likely voters (including leaners), by Race and Employment Status





Figure A.7 above presents vote intention for Donald Trump among white respondents across employment status. As Figure A.7 shows, there are no significant differences in white support for Donald Trump between whites who are employed and those who are unemployed. In sum, it is only among less formally educated white millennial respondents where we find evidence consistent with the narrative that working class white voters bolstered Donald Trump’s candidacy and provided for his victory in the 2016 election. Thus, the story of white support for Donald Trump among the white working-class, at least among Millennials, may be more complicated than initially thought by many in the media.

Vote Choice, by Race/Ethnicity and Age

Finally, in this section we examine differences across age groups among our sample of Millennials. We divide Millennials into three age groups: 18-22 year olds, 23-26 year olds, and 27-30 year olds. Given that Millennials have come of age in different political

and social environments depending on their age range, we wanted to know how vote intention varied across these three age categories. Figure A.8 below examines vote intention for Hillary Clinton by race/ethnicity and these age categories.

Figure A.8 Vote Intention for Hillary Clinton among likely voters (including leaners), by Race and Age Category



As Figure A.8 shows, there are some important differences across age among our sample of Millennials. For African Americans, support for Hillary Clinton *increases* with age, such that older Millennial African Americans were more likely to vote for Clinton than 18-22 Millennial African Americans.³⁵ For Asian Americans, Clinton’s support was much stronger among 18-22-year-old likely voters (92% support) than older Millennial Asian Americans.³⁶ For Latino/as and whites, we do not observe any statistically significant differences across age.

³⁵ The differences across age category in support for Hillary Clinton among African Americans are significant at $p < 0.10$.

³⁶ The differences between 18-22-year-old Asian Americans and the other two age categories is significant at $p < 0.05$.

In Figure A.9, we examine white likely voter support for Donald Trump across age categories. Figure A.9 suggests that Trump’s support was strongest among older white Millennials than younger white Millennials. However, these differences are not statistically significant. Thus, there are no statistically significant differences across age in the white youth vote in 2016.

Figure A.9 Vote Intention for Donald Trump among White likely voters (including leaners), by Race and Age

